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COMMENTS
PENDLETON V. PENDLETON: AN EQUAL RIGHT
OF INHERITANCE FOR THE ILLEGITIMATE?
Why bastard, wherefore base? When my dimensions are as
well compact, My mind as generous, and my shape as true,
As honest madam's issue? Why brand they us With base?
with baseness? bastardy? base, base?
Shakespeare, King Lear, Act I, Scene ii.
I. INTRODUCTION
The illegitimate child has been the butt of social and legal
discrimination since long before Shakespeare's time.' Although
such discrimination is not new, only recently has the illegiti-
mate been given legal rights equal with those of legitimates
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Since 1968 the United States Supreme Court has handed
down a series of decisions giving illegitimates equal rights in
the areas of wrongful death actions, workmen's compensation,
and social security.2 Nevertheless, the historical discrimination
I At common law the illegitimate child was considered a filius nullius (son of no
one) and was completely barred from inheriting property. The law has, however, made
some progress in recognizing the illegitimate's rights. In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68, 70 (1968), the Supreme Court stated: "[I]llegitimate children are not 'non-
persons.' They are humans, live and have their being. They are clearly 'persons'
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
For a general discussion of the illegitimate's rights at common law and in the United
States, see Note, A Return to Filius Nullius, 48 N.D.L. Rv. 59, 60-65 (1971).
2 See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) and Glona v. American Guaran-
tee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) (giving illegitimates and parents of illegitimates the right
to recover in statutory wrongful death actions); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972) (allowing unacknowledged illegitimate children equal rights to work-
men's compensation benefits previously limited to legitimates and acknowledged
illegitimates); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (holding that a statute giving
legitimate children the right to support by the father violates equal protection by
barring illegitimates from the same right); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization
v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (invalidating a statute restricting state welfare benefits
to families in which the parents were formerly married and had at least one legitimate
child); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (holding that illegitimate children
born after their father's disability were entitled to prove their dependency in order to
receive social security benefits). But cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), which
upheld a statute requiring illegitimate children to prove dependency and paternity
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against illegitimates is still evident in the area of intestate
succession.
3
The case in point is Pendleton v. Pendleton4 and the Ken-
tucky statute in question 5 allows the illegitimate child to in-
herit property from the mother but not from the father. The
appellant in Pendleton was the acknowledged illegitimate
child of the intestate, who died unmarried and without other
issue. An equal protection challenge was raised on the basis
that the statute invidiously discriminated against the illegiti-
mate child. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, while clearly
dissatisfied with their decision, felt compelled to uphold the
statute's constitutionality on the basis of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Labine v. Vincent.' In Labine the
Court split five to four to uphold Louisiana's intestate succes-
sion scheme as constitutional, despite its discrimination
against illegitimates. The particular statute challenged al-
lowed the illegitimate child, who had been formally acknowl-
edged by the intestate as his natural issue, to inherit the prop-
erty of the father, but only if there were no ascendants, descen-
dants, collateral kindred, or wife surviving.7
Pendleton, currently on appeal before the United States
Supreme Court,8 is an appropriate case for review.' The facts
before receiving social security benefits, whereas legitimates and certain classes of
illegitimates were presumed eligible.
I Only a few states allow the illegitimate child to inherit equally with legitimates.
See,e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (1969) and ORE. REv. STAT. § 109.060 (1975).
For a general survey of the illegitimate's inheritance rights, see H. KRAUSE, ILLEGI-
TMACY: LAw AND SOCIAL PoLmcy 25-28 (1971).
4 531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1976).
5 Ky. REv. STAT. § 391.090 (1972) [hereinafter cited as KRS]: "(2) a bastard shall
inherit only from his mother and his mother's kindred." Similar statutes include: ALA.
CODE tit. 16 § 7 (1959); GA. CODE ANN. § 113-904 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 12
(Smith-Hurd 1961); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 190 § 5 (1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
702.91(151) (MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (1968)); and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-7 (1953).
401 U.S. 532 (1971).
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1870).
Louisiana allows formal acknowledgment by either or both parents before a notary
public in the presence of two witnesses. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 203 (West 1870).
However, acknowledgment is permitted only if the parents were capable of marrying
at the time of conception, or if the parents have in fact subsequently married. LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 204 (West 1870).
8 Appeal docketed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3077 (U.S. May 11, 1976) (No. 75-1610).
Pendleton is being held in abeyance, pending the United States Supreme Court's
decision on Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 3077, cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3531,
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
and issues are sufficiently similar to those in Labine, and yet
the relevant statutes are clearly distinguishable, so that the
Court has wide berth to choose whether to reaffirm, distin-
guish, or overrule Labine.
II. A REALISTIC LOOK AT POLICY IN RELATION TO KENTUCKY'S
INTESTACY SCHEME
There are several themes running through the courts' justi-
fications for discriminating against illegitimates in the area of
intestate succession. These policy reasons should be closely
examined in relation to a statute barring the illegitimate
child's inheritance from the intestate father but allowing inher-
itance from the intestate mother.10
A. Proof of Paternity Problems
One reason advanced for discrimination against illegiti-
mates is that proof of the paternity of a child born out of wed-
lock is less certain than that of a legitimate child." Underlying
this rationale as it applies to the Kentucky statute of descent
and distribution' 2 is the idea that, whereas the identity of a
child's mother is always ascertainable,'3 men would often be
unjustly accused of fathering illegitimate children who would
thereafter inherit their intestate property.
Actually, there is no surety even within wedlock that a
argued, 45 U.S.L.W. 3430 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 75-5952).
Besides being very similar to Pendleton as to the facts and the Illinois statute
challenged, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1961), Trimble v. Gordon covers
a broader scope. The Court will decide not only the question of discrimination against
and within the class of illegitimates but also the issue of sex discrimination within the
statute.
I For a similar case in which the Illinois Supreme Court also relied on Labine as
controlling, see In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234 (Ill. 1975). Karas was apparently
the basis for the Illinois court's subsequent affirmation without opinion of In re Estate
of Gordon, No. 47339 (ill., Sept. 9, 1975), cert. granted sub nom.Trimble v. Gordon,
45 U.S.L.W. 3077, cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3531, argued 45 U.S.L.W. 3430 (U.S.
Dec. 7, 1976) (No. 75-5952).
,0 For statutes similar to KRS § 391.090(2), see supra note 5.
" Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. Rav. 477, 489 (1967).
,2 KRS § 391.090(2) (1972).
,3 Louisiana is the only state that requires the mother to acknowledge the illegiti-
mate as her natural child before the child can inherit from the mother. LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. arts. 918, 924 (West 1870).
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woman's husband is in fact the father of her child," despite the
law's strong presumption of his paternity. 5 Where there is a
dispute, blood tests can provide more substantial evidence of
paternity than merely eliminating as possible fathers those
with certain blood types."8 At any rate, proof problems do not
exist in the many cases where the father freely acknowledges
his paternity.'7
In Pendleton the deceased had been determined to be the
child's natural father by a bastardy proceeding obligating the
father to support his illegitimate child. Thereaftei until his
death, unmarried and intestate, the deceased consistently re-
ferred to and acknowledged the child as his son. 8 There was
obviously no uncertainty as to the child's paternity, yet Ken-
tucky does not allow even a formally acknowledged illegitimate
child to inherit from the father.'9
Although problems concerning paternity can and do arise,
they are not sufficient justification to deprive the illegitimate
child of his rights. In Gomez v. Perez20 the United States Su-
preme Court held that illegitimate children must be given a
right to the father's support equal with that of legitimates. The
Court realized that the problems as to proof of paternity are
"not to be lightly brushed aside, but neither can they be made
into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise
" Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477, 490-91
(1967).
Is KRS § 406.011 (1972): "A child born within lawful wedlock, or within ten (10)
months thereafter, is presumed to be the child of the husband and wife."
" See KRAUSE, ILLEGrrwACY: LAW AND SOCIAL PoLcY 127-36 (1971), for a discussion
of the validity of blood tests in legal proceedings to determine paternity.
Note however, that in Kentucky blood tests are merely admissible evidence as to
the alleged father's paternity. KRS § 406.11 (1972). See Tackett v. Tackett, 508
S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1974), in which the trial court was held in error for its resolution of
paternity based solely on blood tests without other substantial evidence.
,1 In Labine the parents had acknowledged the appellant as their natural child
according to Louisiana law two months after her birth. Nevertheless, according to
Louisiana's intestacy scheme, the child could inherit the natural father's property only
if there were no surviving legitimate relatives or spouse, and to the exclusion of only
the state. See LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.919 (West 1870).
" Brief for Appellant at 13, Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1976).
" See Helm v. Goin, 14 S.W.2d 183 (Ky. 1929), which held that mere acknowledg-
ment of an illegitimate child, without the parents' subsequent marriage, is insufficient
to qualify the child as an heir at law.
- 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
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invidious discrimination. '21
Even the Pendleton Court cited Gomez with approval,
noting that Kentucky had always enforced the father's obliga-
tion to support his illegitimate child despite proof of paternity
problems. The Court went on to imply that denying the illegiti-
mate child the right to intestate succession equal with legiti-
mates was inconsistent with giving them an equal right to sup-
port.
22
B. Discouraging Promiscuity
Legislation to discourage promiscuity is a valid exercise of
the state's power to regulate its citizens' moral behavior.2
However, there is no rational connection between this stated
purpose and a law allowing the illegitimate to inherit from the
mother but not from the father. Potential parents will not be
dissuaded from engaging in illicit sexual conduct by the fear
that their illegitimate child will not be allowed to inherit from
the father, nor will they be encouraged by the knowledge that
the child will be allowed to inherit from the mother.24
The state would more effectively discourage promiscuity
by acting directly-by enforcing its sanctions on fornication
and adultery and providing incentives such as special tax bene-
fits for legitimate relationships. 2- Punishing the illegitimate
child for the parents' actions in this manner is not only irra-
tional but also grossly unfair. Justice Powell denounced the
injustice of such legislation in Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. :26
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the
11 Id. at 538.
2 531 S.W.2d at 510-11. See also dicta in Green v. Woodard, 318 N.E.2d 397, 407
(Ohio 1974), where the Court of Appeals of Ohio reasoned that if the alleged parent of
an illegitimate must be given the right to prove his paternity in a custody hearing,
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), then the illegitimate child should have a similar
right to prove the father's paternity so as to receive his inheritance rights.
21 H. KRAuS, supra note 16, at 75.
24 The Supreme Court in Glona v. American Guar. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), found
a similar lack of rational connection between the state's purpose of discouraging illegi-
timacy and the statute prohibiting a mother from suing for the wrongful death of her
illegitimate child.
1 H. KRAUSE, supra note 16 at 76.
26 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
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bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the
head of the infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Ob-
viously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing
the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well as an un-
just-way of deterring the parent.Y
C. Encouraging Legal Family Relationships
Closely related to the policy of discouraging promiscuity,
and equally unconvincing, is the policy of encouraging legiti-
mate family relationships through marriage. Again, the state's
purpose is proper but unrelated to the statute.2 The argument
is that if the state provided the illegitimate with all the rights
of the legitimate, including the right of intestate succession
from the father, there would be no other encouragement for the
parents to marry.29 This rationale ignores the fact that the fa-
ther can always include his illegitimate child in a will, and
again fails to explain why the illegitimate is allowed to inherit
from the mother but not from the father. It also focuses upon
the innocent child as the scapegoat for the state's disapproval
of the parents' actions.?°
A more practical approach toward protecting family sta-
bility would be to-consider the effect on the existing family unit
caused by the illegitimate child's inheritance of the father's
intestate property." If the illegitimate were allowed to inherit
" Id. at 175.
" The four members of the dissent in Labine pointed out the fallacy of the Louis-
iana court's state purpose for discriminating against the illegitimate in Louisiana's
intestate succession scheme. There is no relationship between the policy of encouraging
marriage and a statute disinheriting an illegitimate child. 401 U.S. at 559.
" Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MmI. L. REv. 477, 492-93
(1967).
3 The purpose of encouraging marriage is also inapplicable in the situation where
one of the natural parents cannot marry. In Pendleton the mother was already married
at the time the illegitimate child was conceived and born. Brief for Appellees at 16,
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1976).
Note that in Ientucky an illegitimate child can become the legitimate issue of
the natural parents only if they subsequently marry and acknowledge the child as their
own. KRS § 391.090(3) (1972). There is nothing that the illegitimate child himself can
do to change his status.
1, Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MmH. L. REv. 477, 494 (1967).
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equally with the decedent's legitimate issue, his inheritance
would admittedly decrease the shares of the legitimate family.
However, the illegitimate child would merely be taking equally
with the legitimate issue. In many cases the illegitimate child
is more in need of support than the family of the deceased.2
Furthermore, the illegitimate is allowed to inherit from the
mother's estate, regardless of that effect upon the existing fam-
ily unit. And when, as in Pendleton, there is no family unit to
be affected, the case is even stronger for allowing the deceased's
only issue, rather than his collateral relatives,33 to inherit the
intestate's property.
D. Presumption of Father's Intent in Distribution of Property
There may be more support for presuming that most fa-
thers would prefer their legitimate rather than illegitimate
issue to inherit their property. 4 However, the Kentucky statute
in questions deals within the class of illegitimates, permitting
them to inherit from the mother but not from the father.36 The
relevant question is whether the statute reasonably presumes
that the majority of mothers desire their illegitimate children
to inherit equally with their legitimate issue but that most
fathers intend to completely bar their illegitimate children
from inheritance.
37
32 In Kentucky the illegitimate's right to support by the father ends at the father's
death. KRS § 406.041 (1972).
' In Pendleton, the deceased's brother, sister, and nephew inherited the estate.
Brief for Appellees at 2, Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507 (1976).
Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. Rav. 477, 501-02
(1967).
(6 KRS § 391.090(2) (1972).
3 There is implied discrimination between legitimates and illegitimates in KRS
§ 391.090(2) in that the illegitimate child can never inherit intestate property from the
father while the legitimate child is not barred.
31 Although this issue is not mentioned by the court in Pendleton, there may be a
due process question as to whether it is constitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment to presume that illegitimates are outside the class of intestate takers intended
by the father, solely on the basis of their status. For more on the theory of irrebuttable
presumptions, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). For irrebuttable presumptions in cases related to illegiti-
macy, see Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.
628 (1974), especially Justice Rehnquist's dissent; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972). See also 10 N. ENG. L. Rav. 561, 566-69 (1975).
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E. The Reality of Prejudice
The real reason for discrimination against illegitimates is
prejudice, stemming historically from society's disapproval of
illicit sex .3 The "central reality" is that legislators misguidedly
punish illegitimates for their parents' actions. 9 Statutes like
that of Kentucky4° seem to recognize the close bond between
mother and child as the justification for the concession of al-
lowing the illegitimate child to inherit from the mother, instead
of completely barring any inheritance at all.
The ancient tradition of prejudice against illegitimates is
breaking down, as is evidenced by recent Supreme Court deci-
sions giving illegitimates equal rights with legitimates.41 There
is no convincing public policy that can be furthered by statutes
limiting the illegitimates' rights of intestate succession; there
is no rationale that can withstand the force of equal protection
principles if applied.
II. INTRA-CLAss DIsCRIMINATION: A CHANCE TO DISTINGUISH
LABINE,
The query after Labine v. Vincent is whether the area of
intestate succession will remain untouched by principles of
equal protection-whether it is so traditionally an area gov-
erned by the various states that the Supreme Court will not
move to correct the discrimination in these statutes.
A. The Supreme Court's Stance in Labine
The majority's position in Labine can be summed up by
their statement:
[T]he power to make rules to establish, protect, and
strengthen family life as well as to regulate the disposition of
intestate property ... is committed by the people of Louis-
iana to the legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this
Court to select from among possible laws.4"
Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. Rav. 477, 498-99
(1967).
3, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 558 (dissenting opinion).
" KRS § 391.090(2) (1972).
" See note 2 supra.
, 401 U.S. at 539-40.
1977l
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65
Thus the Court blankly refused to examine the rationality of
Louisiana's intestate succession statute, 3 even in the face of an
equal protection challenge by the illegitimate child. The major-
ity deferred to the legislature's traditional power to regulate the
devolution of intestate property" without the barest inquiry as
to whether there was any rational relationship between the
discriminatory statute and the legislature's goal of protecting
family life. 5
Justice Brennan, the author of the dissenting opinion, con-
sidered the majority's opinion unprincipled, stating that no
statute can be immune from the equal protection clause merely
because it is within an area traditionally governed by the
states." Although the state may have broad powers to classify,
there must be a substantial reason for drawing the line; other-
wise, it is invidious discrimination prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment. Despite the strong dissent, Labine has not been
attacked by a majority of the Court. In fact the Court, by their
subsequent distinction of Labine in Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.," seemed to imply that Labine would stand.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1870).
" The Labine majority seemed to apply the old equal protection test used by the
Warren Court to uphold economic and social regulations against equal protection
challenges. Under this test if any reason could be conceived for the state's classifica-
tion, then the statute was presumed to be constitutional. See, e.g., McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
5 The majority in a brief aside commented that even if they were to apply a
rational relationship test, the statute would be found to have a rational basis in the
state's interests in promoting family life and in directing the devolution of intestate
property. But the Court does not explain how they would reach that conclusion. See
401 U.S. at 536 n.6.
11 Id. at 550. The dissent also mentioned United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643
(1961), in which the states' power to regulate intestate succession was not immune
under the tenth amendment from federal laws "necessary and proper" to the exercise
of a delegated power. Id. at 548, n.16.
11 406 U.S. at 170-71. The Court first distinguished Weber by noting that the
decision in Labine was greatly influenced by the Court's respect for the state's power
to regulate intestate succession, a deference not present in the workmen's compensa-
tion area involved in Weber. The second distinction involved the fact that the intestate
in Labine could have provided for his child in a will or could have legitimized the child
upon marrying the mother. In contrast, the petitioner in Weber could do nothing to
make his children eligible to receive the statutory benefits. Louisiana law prohibited
parents' acknowledgment of the children if they were incapable of marrying at the time
of conception or thereafter. Id. The Court's second distinction does not, however recog-
nize the fact that the illegitimate child himself can take no action to modify his status.
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B. Intra-Class Discrimination in Pendleton
There are two levels of analysis of equal protection under
the law.48 The first level examines the statute in question to
determine whether it applies equally to the class involved, i.e.,
whether the statute includes all illegitimates within its scope.
The second level looks deeper to examine whether the status
of illegitimacy is a permissible basis for the discriminatory
classification. This determination depends on whether there is
a rational relationship between the statute and a proper state
purpose." This second level is the "rational relationship" test
which the Labine majority found unnecessary to apply, due to
their presumption of the statute's constitutionality.50
The first level describes the intra-class discrimination that
is found in Kentucky's intestate succession scheme. Green v.
Woodard,51 a 1974 Ohio decision, used this rationale to strike
down a statute similar to the Kentucky 'statute"2 as violative of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment."
Since Ohio's and Kentucky's intestate succession schemes are
very similar, the Green rationale is applicable to the facts and
issues in Pendleton.54
In Green, the Ohio descent and distribution statute" listed
u For an excellent general discussion of classifications under the equal protection
clause, see Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALiF. L. REv.
341 (1949).
" Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477, 486 (1967).
" If the majority had applied the "rational relationship" test in Labine, they
probably would have decided that the state's articulated purpose, to promote family
life, was a proper goal. The real question is whether the Court would have found, as
did the dissent, that the intestate succession scheme discriminating against illegiti-
mates did not further the state's purpose.
" 318 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1974).
52 KRS § 391.090(2) (1972).
The appellant in Green claimed to be the unacknowledged illegitimate child of
the deceased, whereas Cecil Pendleton had been acknowledged by the deceased to be
his natural child. The Ohio court obviously did not consider acknowledgment neces-
sary in order for the illegitimate to receive inheritance rights.
11 See notes 55 and 58 infra, for a comparison of the Kentucky and Ohio statutes
involved in Pendleton and Green.
SOHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page 1968):
"When a person dies intestate .... [the property] shall descend and pass.., in
the following course:
(A) If there is no surviving spouse, to the children of the intestate . .. .
The parallel Kentucky statute is KRS § 391.010(1) (1972):
"When a person. . . dies ... intestate..., the estate shall descend in common to
1977]
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"children" as among the takers of intestate property. The term
"children" in the statute had been interpreted to refer only to
legitimate children as intestate takers." However, a second
Ohio statute57 allowed the illegitimate child to inherit from and
through the mother as if the child were legitimate.5 This sec-
ond statute in effect modified the meaning of "children" in the
descent and distribution statute to include as intestate takers
those illegitimate children inheriting from the mother, as well
as all legitimate children. The Ohio court reasoned that this
was intra-class discrimination in the treatment of illegitimate
children in the descent and distribution statute, because the
word "children" was extended to include only those illegiti-
mates inheriting from the mother and not the remaining mem-
bers of the class.5 The Ohio court went on to reject as invalid
the policies offered to justify the discrimination in the statute. 0
Since there was no convincing reason for the intra-class dis-
crimination, the court found the discrimination to be invidious,
holding that equal protection demanded the modification of
"children" in the descent and distribution statute be extended
to include all illegitimate children.6'
The decision in Labine can be distinguished from Green,
and therefore from Pendleton, in several ways. First, Louis-
iana's intestacy scheme is substantially different from Ken-
his kindred, male and female, in the following order...:
(1) To his children and their descendants...
58 318 N.E.2d at 401.
'T OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.17 (Page 1968).
"Children born out of wedlock shall be capable of inheriting or transmitting
inheritance from and to their mother ... " OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.17 (Page 1968).
KRS § 391.090(2) states: "A bastard shall inherit only from his mother and his
mother's kindred" (emphasis added). Whereas Kentucky implies exclusion of the ille-
gitimate child from the father's inheritance, Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2105.17 is silent
as to inheritance from the father. This slight difference does not affect the applicability
of the equal protection rationale used by the Ohio court.
5, 318 N.E.2d at 401-02.
60 The justifications found invalid by the Ohio court included the following:
(1)Distribution of intestate property to be exclusively within the state's power, relied
upon in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. at 539; (2) absence of total discrimination against
illegitimate children because they could receive property under a will or could be
legitimized so as to be able to inherit property, asserted in Labine v. Vincent, id. at
540; (3) problems of proving paternity, rejected in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. at 538;
(4) fear of spurious claims, overcome in Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. at 628, 634-
35. See Green v. Woodard, 318 N.W.2d at 406.
6" 318 N.W.2d at 408.
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tucky's and Ohio's.62 Louisiana can be said to group children
into three classes according to their intestate succession rights:
legitimates, acknowledged illegitimates (termed "natural chil-
dren"),63 and unacknowledged illegitimates. 4 Unacknowledged
illegitimates are not permitted to inherit intestate property
from the father or the mother; 5 therefore there is obviously no
discrimination within this class, nor within the class of legiti-
mates.
Within the class of acknowledged illegitimates (which in-
cludes the appellant in Labine), the order of intestate succes-
sion is different, depending on whether the child is to inherit
from the father or the mother.66 But ostensibly the acknowl-
edged illegitimate has a chance to inherit from either parent;"
there is none of the clear intra-class discrimination which was
struck down in Green. Thus in Louisiana whether the child
inherits from the father or mother, neither the acknowledged
illegitimate nor the unacknowledged child is ever allowed
rights equal with those of a legitimate child; the discrimination
is totally between classes, not within one group. 8 Labine then
can be interpreted as holding that discrimination between the
two classes of legitimates and illegitimates is constitutional
under the fourteenth amendment, whereas Green focuses upon
impermissible intra-class discrimination within the class of il-
,z For a clear explanation of the illegitimate's position in Louisiana's unique
scheme of descent and distribution, see 10 LOYOLA L. REv. 188 (1971-72).
43 See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 202 (West 1870).
" The Kentucky and Ohio statutes do not mention any difference in treatment
between acknowledged and unacknowledged illegitimates for the purpose of intestate
succession.
'5 LA. CIv. CODE AmN. art. 920 (West 1870).
" Although this difference within the order of intestate succession may possibly
be considered intra-class discrimination, the acknowledged illegitimate is not com-
pletely barred from inheriting from the father, as is the case in Kentucky and Ohio.
'I The natural child inherits from the mother if there are no legitimate descen-
dants, to the exclusion of all her surviving legitimate ascendants, collaterals and hus-
band. If there are legitimate descendants, the natural child receives only a modest
alimony. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 918 (West 1870).
The natural child takes from the father only if there are no legitimate ascendants,
descendants, collaterals, or wife surviving, and to the exclusion of only the state. See
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 919, 924 (West 1870).
11 The author does not condone the total discrimination between legitimates and
illegitimates but merely points out that the superficial form of the discrimination may
be permissible, whether or not the substantive basis of the classification is justified.
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legitimates. 9
An alternative interpretation of Labine and a possible dis-
tinction may exist in that Louisiana does allow the acknowl-
edged illegitimate to inherit, albeit only after the father's other
kindred. One might consider Labine to merely hold that the
Court could not constitutionally rearrange the statutory order
of intestate succession. In Kentucky the illegitimate child is
not only disadvantaged in the order of intestate succession, but
is completely barred from inheriting from the father. 0
IV. CONCLUSION
Because of the Supreme Court's blank deference to the
traditional power of the states to regulate intestate succession,
Labine appears to close the door in the face of all equal protec-
tion challenges." Nevertheless, Labine is a constitutional hold-
ing and open to re-examination. 72 If the Supreme Court decides
to use Pendleton as a vehicle to re-examine their decision in
Labine, there are several theories the Court could use to reaf-
firm or to overrule Labine.
The most obvious possibility is that the Court will decide
that illegitimacy is a suspect classification requiring a compel-
ling state interest to justify the discrimination. 73 The Court
thus far has either refused or considered it unnecessary to take
this step.74 Still, such a holding is a distinct possibility in view
" See also Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), in which intra-class dis-
crimination within the class of illegitimates for the purpose of determining the availa-
bility of social security benefits was declared unconstitutional as violative of equal
protection.
7 Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1976).
" The Court in Pendleton, albeit reluctantly, considered Labine controlling:
We are equipped with neither a crystal ball nor the type of scales on
which it is evident that a right must be weighed in order to determine
whether it is heavy enough to register under the 14th Amendment. Nor are
we willing to undertake the sophistry of distinguishing Labine v. Vincent
... . Suffice it to say that it has not been overruled by the court that has
the exclusive power to overrule it, and we think that as long as it remains
the law it governs this case.
531 S.W.2d at 511.
72 See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 257-59 (1970) and
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-10 (1932).
11 See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) for a discussion of
the Court's scrutiny of suspect classifications.
11 In Labine the dissent stated that they did not reach the question of whether
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of the similarity of development of suspect classifications in the
areas of race and alienage.75 The Court noted certain criteria
as indicating suspectness in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriquez.7 1 Illegitimates seem to meet all the cri-
teria: They are certainly burdened with social and legal disabil-
ities; they have historically been singled out as a target of
discrimination; and they have so little political force as to need
special protection by the legislatures.
77
A more likely approach is a "means-oriented" equal pro-
tection test in which the Court looks for a substantial relation-
ship between the challenged statute (the "means" used by the
state to achieve its goals) and the articulated state purpose.
78
In applying this test the Court would accept as permissible the
state's declared goal of avoiding proof of paternity problems
and concentrate upon whether a statute discriminating against
the illegitimate as to inheritance rights actually and substan-
illegitimacy was a suspect classification because the "rational basis" standard was
sufficient to prove the discrimination unconstitutional. 401 U.S. at 551 n.19.
The appellants in Jimenez v. Weinberger urged that illegitimacy is suspect be-
cause it is a characteristic determined entirely by birth; it is a status that the illegiti-
mate is powerless to change; and it subjects the illegitimate to the stigma of inferiority
and disgrace. The majority held the discrimination invidious for lack of a rational
basis, not reaching the issue of suspectness. 417 U.S. at 631-32.
But in Mathews v. Lucas the Court stated that illegitimacy was not a suspect
classification because the discrimination had never been as extensive or severe as that
aimed against blacks and women, nor was illegitimacy an obvious badge like race and
sex. 427 U.S. 495.
"' For cases involving the suspect classifications of race and alienage, see Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
In the evolving area of equal protection as to gender, see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
7, 411 U.S. at 29 (1973).
See Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 933-34 n.85 (1973). Ely urges special suspicion toward classifications in which the
decision-makers, who are members of the majority class, are likely to rely on historical
stereotypes which portray certain minorities, e.g., blacks and women, as inferior and
therefore as likely objects of discrimination.
18 This theory was dubbed "minimum scrutiny with bite" by Professor Gerald
Gunther and was described as bridging the gap between the "old equal protection" test
with its presumption of the statute's constitutionality and the "new equal protection"
test with its very strict scrutiny of statutes involving suspect classifications and funda-
mental rights. For an explication of this theory, see Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HAnv. L. Rav. 1 (1972).
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tially furthers that goal. This was the rationale used by the
dissent in Labine to find that the statute's discrimination
against an acknowledged illegitimate had no rational basis.7
Another recent theory is based upon the Court's rationale
in Jimenez v. Weinberger."0 In that case the Supreme Court
used a combination of the "means-oriented" equal protection
and the due process irrebuttable presumption tests to hold the
discriminating statute unconstitutional. Not only did the
Court find that the statute in question was not a rational
means to achieve the state's goal, but they also determined
that the statute deprived the appellants of their right to claim
social security benefits without giving them the chance to
prove their eligibility as dependehts.
8 '
At odds with the "means-oriented" theory is Justice
Marshall's "sliding scale" approach. The intensity of the
Court's scrutiny would depend upon balancing the importance
of the interest threatened by the classification against the
effectiveness of the state's statutory scheme in achieving cer-
tain goals and the importance of those stated goals. 2 This same
approach was used in Weber. 3 The Court there asked: (1)
What legitimate state interest does the classification further?
and (2) What fundamental personal rights" might be threat-
ened by the classification? Under this approach the Court
7, 401 U.S. at 553.
417 U.S. 628 (1974).
1, See note 37 supra for cases dealing with irrebuttable presumptions.
2 For Justice Marshall's attempts to articulate this approach, see San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-133 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-30 (1970)(Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 479 (1974), for a
convincing application of Justice Marshall's approach to explain the Supreme Court's
extension of equal protection to illegitimates in several areas and their refusal to do
the same in the area of intestate succession.
1 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 173. See note 2 supra for a general
statement of the Court's holding.
11 Under the equal protection clause, strict scrutiny requiring a compelling state
interest is applied whenever certain fundamental personal rights are threatened as well
as when a suspect classification is involved. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
It is interesting to speculate whether the right of intestate succession could be
considered so important as to be a fundamental right protected by the fourteenth
amendment. If so, then the state could regulate the disposition of such property only
so long as the illegitimate were not completely barred from inheriting.
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would balance the importance of the illegitimate's inheritance
rights against the importance of the state's goals and the effec-
tiveness of the intestate succession scheme in achieving those
goals.
Although it is possible under any of the four rationales
above that the Supreme Court will reaffirm or overrule Labine
upon re-examination, it is more probable that they would
choose to distinguish Pendleton on the grounds that it involves
intra-class discrimination. The dissent in Labine was strong
and unified, and since that decision the Court's personnel has
changed. 5 In light of the subsequent decisions in favor of the
illegitimate's rights at law88 and the dissatisfaction shown by
the courts in Green and Pendleton,7 the Supreme Court may
decide it is time to re-examine the illegitimate's rights in the
area of intestate succession. If so, Pendleton offers the Court
a clear opportunity to recognize the illegitimate's right to in-
herit property equally with legitimates under the fourteenth
amendment.*
Donna Chu
33 It is significant to note that after Labine, two of the five justices in the majority,
Justices Black and Harlan, were replaced by Justices Powell and Rehnquist. There-
after the Court handed down several decisions favorable to illegitimates. See note 2
supra. On the other hand, one of the dissenters in Labine, Justice Douglas, has since
resigned. Thus a current count of the Labine Court (assuming all of the original voters
are of the same mind) would be three to three leaving three votes uncertain.
U See note 2 supra.
8 If a state cannot constitutionally force a father to support his children
without including illegitimate children, we can find no justification in logic
for its authority to deny illegitimate children the same right of inheritance
conferred upon other children. Though... the father may of course discrimi-
nate against any child, legitimate or illegitimate, it seems incongruous that
the state should be allowed to do it for him. But after all, this is mere logic,
which seems to have a declining importance in the world of constitutional
jurisprudence.
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d at 511.
* Editor's Note: Since this Comment was written, there have been several sig-
nificant developments. In April, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision, the Court struck down an Illinois statute which prohibited an illegitimate
from inheriting from his father's intestate estate. Since the law was held unconstitu-
tional on equal protection grounds, the Court did not reach the sex discrimination issue
also raised by the appellant.
raised by the appellant.
Writing for the plurality, Mr. Justice Powell cited Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976), and Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), in reaffirming that,
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
although illegitimacy is not a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny, neverthe-
less such classification requires a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.
The state goals of preserving stability of titles and orderly disposition of intestate
property are not hindered in a substantial number of cases where the illegitimate's
paternity is not in dispute. The plurality opinion, while rejecting the Court's previous
deference to state intestacy laws in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 572 (1971), did not
overrule that decision. The Court instead chose to distinguish Labine on the basis of
the difference in Louisiana's classification of illegitimates for the purpose of intestate
succession. See text accompanying nn. 62-68 supra.
On the other hand, the four dissenting justices briefly stated that they found the
instant case "constitutionally indistinguishable" from Labine and would have accord-
ingly upheld the Illinois statute. No. 75-5952, slip op. at 15 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1977). Mr.
Justice Rehnquist filed a separate dissent in which he deplored the Court's use of the
equal protection clause to "instruct [state legislatures] in a better understanding of
how to accomplish their ordinary legislative tasks." No. 75-5952, dissenting opinion at
8 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1977).
On May 17, United Press International reported that the United States Supreme
Court had issued a directive to both Kentucky and New York State courts to "review
earlier rulings against illegitimates inheriting from their fathers." Lexington Herald,
May 17, 1977, § C-7, col. 2.
On May 20, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decided Rudolph v. Rudolph, No.
Ca-373-MR (C.A. Ky. May 20, 1977) and held KRS § 391.090 unconstitutional. The
Court of Appeals found the statute unconstitutional under Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution "insofar as that statute would bar the appellant from inheriting from his
father." Id. at 3.
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